

Message Text

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LIMDIS

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

EO: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ALLIED TACTIC PAPER

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF TACTICS PAPER WHICH EMERGED FROM 16 JANUARY AHG MEETING. FURTHER REVIEW OF PAPER WILL TAKE PLACE IN AD HOC GROUP MEETING JANUARY 17. THE TACTICS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE DRAWN ON BY ALLIED REPS CHARGED WITH PROBING SOVIET HINTS PRIOR TO MID-DECEMBER RECESS OF TALKS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT TO ALLIED TWO-PHASE CONCEPT. WHEN FINALLY AGREED, IT WILL BE REPORT-ED TO THE NATO COUNCIL FOR ITS INFORMATION AS INDICATION OF TAC-TICAL LINE AHG INTENDS TO FOLLOW IN NEXT PERIOD. BEGIN TEXT.

NEXT TACTICAL STEPS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. TO SUPPLEMENT PRESENTATIONS OF THE ALLIED PHASE I PROGRAM IN PLENARY SESSIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD, WHILE CONTINUING TO REMAIN SECRET

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WITHIN THE LIMITS OF C-M(73)83 REVISED, FOLLOW THE TACTIC OF SEEK-

ING TO PROBE HINTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION IN ORDER TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO DEFER, IF ONLY TEMPORARILY, FOR THE PRACTICAL PURPOSE OF BEGINNING DISCUSSION AT SOME SPECIFIC POINT, THEIR INTEREST IN COVERAGE OF NON-US NATO FORCES, AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES.

2. TO THIS END, THE ALLIES WOULD SEEK AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS THAT THE PROCESS OF EAST-WEST DISCUSSION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM UNILATERAL PRESENTATIONS, WOULD BEGIN BY TALKING ABOUT US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THE PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS AS A LIMITED PROCEDURAL ONE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE.

3. THIS STEP IS DESIGNED TO OPEN THE WAY FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF, AND EXPLORATION OF EASTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD, THE ENTIRE PHASE I WESTERN NEGOTIATING PROGRAM, INCLUDING ITS REDUCTION COMPONENT, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND STABILIZING MEASURES, AND AS THE FIRST MOVE IN A GRADUAL PROCESS OF BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN APPROACH AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. TO ACHIEVE THE UNDERSTANDING DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES (WITHOUT OFFERING ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENT FROM THEIR SIDE) TO INDICATE READINESS TO DISCUSS AT A LATER STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TIMING OF PHASE II, TO OFFER SOME SLIGHTLY CLEARER RE-AFFIRMATION OF THEIR INTENTION THAT NON-US NATO FORCES WOULD BE COVERED IN PHASE II IN THE EVENT OF A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I, AND TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW.

5. THE ALLIES WOULD TELL THE SOVIETS THAT, AT A SUITABLE TIME LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF A PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COVER THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THIS POINT IS IMPLICIT IN WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY SAID TO THE SOVIETS. IF PRESSED FURTHER ON THE TIMING OF THE SECOND PHASE, THE ALLIES COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND-PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AFTER CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WITH THE DURATION OF THAT FIXED PERIOD TO BE AGREED LATER IN THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS DURING DISCUSSION OF THE

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PROVISION ALREADY REFERRED TO. THE PHRASE "A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" IS DELIBERATELY INDEFINITE; ITS DEFINITION IS OPEN FOR SUBSEQUENT ALLIED DECISION, WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED FOR SATISFACTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

6. THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY SEEK FIRMER ASSURANCES THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD ACTUALLY INCLUDE EUROPEAN NATO FORCES. IF SO,

THE ALLIES MIGHT, STILL WITHOUT GOING INTO THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF PHASE II, TELL THE SOVIETS THAT, FOLLOWING A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THE REDUCTION TO THE COMMON CEILING WHICH SHOULD RESULT FROM PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, ON THE ALLIED SIDE, FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE "FOCUS" LANGUAGE IS TAKEN FROM THE AGREED ALLIED POSITION PAPER. IF THE SOVIETS PERSIST IN ASKING WHETHER "OTHER FORCES" WOULD INCLUDE THE BUNDESWEHR, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD REPLY THAT THEY ENVISAGE THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASE II TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING WOULD ON THE ALLIED SIDE INVOLVE REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS AMONG THE ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET REQUESTS FOR WESTERN ASSURANCES ON INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIES COULD SAY THAT THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS IN GETTING AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE STARTED ON THE SUBJECT OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. BY DEFERRING THEIR INTEREST IN NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN ORDER TO DISCUSS US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AS PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES, THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE FOREGOING THEIR RIGHT IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE TO RAISE SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THEM.

8. IF THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR FURTHER ASSURANCES ON THESE POINTS, THEY WOULD BE REMINDED THAT THE ALLIES WERE SEEKING ONLY A LIMITED AND STRICTLY PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE VIEWS OF EITHER SIDE ON SUBSTANCE AND THAT A SMALL STEP OF THIS KIND MERITED NO MORE CLARIFICATION THAN THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN; HENCE, THE ALLIES WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN THE POINTS ALREADY MADE.HUMES

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